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Constitutional Challenges to Bans On
"Assisted Suicide": The View From
Without and Within
By ROBERT A. SEDLER*
Introduction
Michigan is the home state of "assisted suicide's" most visible
practitioner, Dr. Jack Kevorkian. Although public opinion polls in
Michigan show strong support for assisted suicide in certain circum-
stances, and for that matter, for Dr. Kevorkian himself, efforts to
"stop Kevorkian" have long been a prominent feature of the Michigan
legal and political scene. Kevorkian's assisted suicide activity has
been strongly opposed by a number of legislators and prosecutors, and
by the politically powerful Michigan Right to Life lobby.' During the
1992-93 session, a number of bills dealing with assisted suicide were
introduced in the Michigan Legislature, ranging from permitting as-
sisted suicide in certain circumstances2 to completely prohibiting as-
sisted suicide in all circumstances? Faced with this politically-charged
and highly controversial issue, the Michigan Legislature decided to do
what legislatures often do in such a situation-appoint a blue ribbon
commission to study the matter. The day before the agreed-upon bill
establishing the study commission4 was to be voted on in the Michigan
House, however, Kevorkian performed another of his now familiar
* A.B., 1956; J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh. Professor of Law, Wayne State
University. This Article is a substantially expanded version of an earlier article, Robert A.
Sedler, The Constitution and Hastening Inevitable Death, HASTINGS CR. REP., Sept.-Oct.,
1993, at 20. Professor Sedler is an active constitutional litigator, predominently as a volun-
teer attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union. He is a member of the ACLU legal
team challenging Michigan's assisted suicide law, with the primary responsibility for devel-
oping a substantive constitutional challenge to the law.
1. Gene Schabath & Robert Ourlian, Kevorkian Opponents Want Aided-Suicide Ban
Moved Up, DEr. NEws, Feb. 16, 1993.
2. S. 211, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1993).
3. S. 32, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1991).
4. The study commission was directed to make recommendations to the legislature
on the entire subject of "assisted suicide"-including whether or not "assisted suicide"
should be made a criminal offense.
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assisted suicides, which, as usual, received nationwide media cover-
age.5 This renewed the legislative clamor: "Stop Kevorkian" and
"Don't let Michigan become the Nation's suicide capitol." The study-
commission bill was amended on the floor of the House to add a pro-
vision making assisted suicide a criminal offense. The amended bill
was quickly passed by the House and the Senate and signed into law
by the Governor.6
Michigan's ban on assisted suicide is sweeping in scope. Under
the law, a person is guilty of "criminal assistance to suicide" if that
person "has knowledge that another person intends to commit or at-
tempt to commit suicide and.., intentionally (a) [p]rovides the physi-
cal means by which the other person attempts or commits suicide [or]
(b)[p]articipates in a physical act by which the other person attempts
or commits suicide."'7 The only intent necessary for a violation of the
law is the intent to "provide the physical means" or "participate in a
physical act" with the "knowledge that another person intends to
commit or attempt to commit suicide." There need not be any intent
that the other person should actually commit suicide. So if a terminally
ill person has told a spouse or friend, "I sometimes wish I could die,"
and the spouse or friend provides the glass of water that the termi-
nally ill person uses to swallow a lethal dose of medication, the spouse
or friend has violated the law. The furnishing of the "physical means"
with the requisite knowledge that a person has threatened suicide is
sufficient to subject the spouse or friend to up to four years'
imprisonment.
The law does not make any exception for the terminally ill, and
specifically defines assisted suicide to include the prescription of lethal
medications by a physician to a terminally ill patient for the purpose
of enabling the patient to use the medications to hasten inevitable
death.8 Thus, Michigan law prohibits a physician from prescribing
medications to terminally ill patients in quantities that would em-
power the patients to use the medications to hasten inevitable death,
and prohibits them from instructing patients how to make use of the
medications for this purpose. In other words, in Michigan, a termi-
5. Michigan Vote Declares Assisted Suicide a Felony, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1992, at
A2.
6. See MicH. Comp. LAWS § 752.1027 (1993).
7. Id. at § 752.1027(1).
8. The law states that it does not apply to "[a] licensed health care professional who
administers, prescribes, or dispenses medications or procedures to relieve a person's pain
or discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or increase the risk of
death.... ." Id. at § 752.1027(3).
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nally ill person, no matter how excruciating that person's pain and
suffering, will not be able to receive any assistance from a physician,
family member, or friend, in implementing that person's decision to
hasten inevitable death. For these and other reasons, the American
Civil Liberties Union of Michigan has asserted a constitutional chal-
lenge to the state's ban on assisted suicide.
This Article's analysis of constitutional challenges to bans on as-
sisted suicide comes "from without and within"-from the dual per-
spectives of the author's role as an academic commentator and as a
constitutional litigator.9 To the extent that the impartial and dispas-
sionate perspective of a pure legal scholar is considered a virtue, this
perspective is admittedly lacking. However, participation as an advo-
cate can yield insights that detached scholarly observation cannot
provide.
Initially, this Article will discuss the ACLU's substantive constitu-
tional challenge to Michigan's ban on assisted suicide. 10 The basis of
that challenge to the ban" is a limited one, specifically that the ban on
assisted suicide is unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits terminally ill
persons from making use of physician-prescribed medications to
hasten inevitable death. The Article then engages the "slippery
slope" argument, distinguishing between the application of a ban on
assisted suicide to terminally ill persons and persons who have be-
come so debilitated by illness that their life has become
"unendurable," and other persons, who wish to end their life "for
whatever reason.' 2  This Article argues that, under applicable
Supreme Court doctrine and precedent, a ban on assisted suicide is
unconstitutional as applied to the terminally ill and to the physically
debilitated persons who wish to end their "unendurable" life, but is
constitutional in its completely hypothetical application to persons
who wish to end their life "for whatever reason." In advancing this
9. The author has approached other legal questions in this manner. See Robert A.
Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on "Racist Speech:" The View from With-
out and Within, 53 U. Prrr. L. Rlv. 631 (1992); Robert A. Sedler, The Summary Contempt
Power and the Constitution: The View from Without and Within, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34
(1976); Robert A. Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken: On Losing
Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q.
535; Robert A. Sedler, The Procedural Defense in Selective Service Prosecutions: The View
from Without and Within, 56 IowA L. Rv. 1121 (1971).
10. See infra notes 13-47 and accompanying text.
11. In addition to the substantive constitutional challenge and the challenge to the
process by which the law was enacted, see infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text, the law
has been challenged as being unconstitutionally vague and indefinite.
12. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
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view, this Article develops the "choice principle." The concluding
portion of the Article contends that the choice principle protects a
person's decision to prolong life as well as to terminate it, and so im-
poses significant constitutional restraints on any governmental effort
to "ration" the health care necessary to prolong the life of terminally
ill persons or very old persons or to alleviate the condition of physi-
cally debilitated or disabled persons.
I. The Constitutional Right of the Terminally Ill to Hasten
Inevitable Death
The ACLU's substantive constitutional challenge to Michigan's
ban on assisted suicide is based on the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process guarantee of liberty. The ACLU and this Article argue that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of terminally ill patients
to hasten their inevitable death, and that Michigan's ban on assisted
suicide is unconstitutional as an undue burden on that right. In devel-
oping this constitutional challenge, this Article responds to the con-
tention advanced by opponents of assisted suicide, such as Professor
Yale Kamisar, that laws against assisted suicide are fully constitu-
tional.'3 In so doing this Article frames the issue for the specific con-
text of the ACLU constitutional challenge to Michigan's ban on
assisted suicide. This is quite different from the way the opponents of
assisted suicide have typically framed the issue.
A. Properly Framing the Issue
A distinguished constitutional scholar has observed: "Once taken
into our constitutional law system, the dialogue takes on a new seri-
ousness. It is, therefore, critically important that we get the questions
right and the answers right, because constitutional law is written in
concrete and is not easily washed out by rain or tears."' 4 The right
question, as regards the ACLU challenge to Michigan's ban on as-
sisted suicide, is not whether there is a constitutional right to assisted
suicide or a constitutional right to die. Rather, the right question is
about a terminally ill person's right to hasten inevitable death. The
right question is whether an absolute ban on the use of physician-pre-
scribed medications by a terminally ill person to hasten that person's
inevitable death, if and when the person chooses to do so, is an undue
13. See Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HAsmNGS
CR. REP., May-June 1993, at 32.
14. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis, 67 CAL. L. RFv. 69, 70
(1979).
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burden' 5 on that person's due process liberty interest. Any undue
burden here is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause 6 and thus unconstitutional.
As in many constitutional cases, an understanding of the ACLU
challenge to Michigan's assisted suicide ban must begin by looking at
the people who are bringing the challenge and how the ban effects
what they want to do. The ACLU did not bring the constitutional
challenge to the law on behalf of Dr. Kevorkian,' 7 on behalf of propo-
nents of voluntary euthanasia, or on behalf of non-terminally ill per-
sons who wish to terminate an unendurable existence. The principal
plaintiffs in the case are both terminally ill cancer patients who want
to have the choice to hasten their inevitable death by taking a lethal
dose of physician-prescribed medications, and the physicians who
want to prescribe medications so that their patients will have this
choice. The physician plaintiffs do not want to give lethal injections to
terminally ill patients, nor to perform voluntary euthanasia in any way
whatsoever, and the patient plaintiffs do not want to have their lives
ended in such a manner.
What the patient plaintiffs do want, and what the physician plain-
tiffs want to provide, is patient empowerment to choose to hasten inev-
itable death. The physician plaintiffs want to be permitted, when they
consider it medically appropriate, to provide their patients with barbi-
turates, opiates, or other medications in sufficient quantities that the
patients may, at the time of their own choosing, immediately termi-
nate their lives by consuming a lethal dosage. In this respect, patient
empowerment encompasses both pain control and the hastening of
inevitable death. The patient takes the medications to relieve pain,
but if the pain becomes so unbearable that the patient no longer wants
to continue living with it, or if the patient simply does not want to go
on living any longer, the patient can "take the whole bottle," so to
speak, and bring the suffering to a merciful end.
Unlike Dr. Kevorkian's assisted suicides, and unlike voluntary
euthanasia, patient empowerment means that physician intervention
is not necessary at the time of death, and that there may not be direct
physician involvement with the patient's death at all. There are no
15. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
16. The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution states in part: "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; ... ." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
17. By tacit mutual agreement the ACLU and Dr. Kevorkian have kept at some con-
siderable distance from each other.
Spm'ngz 19941
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"suicide machines" or television cameras. There is no appointed time
at which the physician comes to the patient's home or hospital room
to administer a lethal injection. Everything is in the patient's control.
Only the patient, or family members, friends, or the physician, if the
patient so chooses, will know of the patient's decision before it is car-
ried out. The only sign of death is the empty bottle. The patient her-
self has determined the timing of her inevitable death and her release
from unbearable pain and suffering.
Once the right of terminally ill patients to hasten their inevitable
death by the use of physician-prescribed medications is firmly estab-
lished as a matter of constitutional law, much of the controversy over
assisted suicide may dissipate by its own force. At the least, the con-
troversy will no longer involve the terminally ill. Once it is under-
stood by both physicians and patients that physicians are legally
permitted to prescribe medications in such quantities as to empower
the terminally ill patient to make the choice to hasten inevitable
death, there will no longer be any need for Dr. Kevorkian and his
suicide machine. And there may not even be a need for voluntary
euthanasia. A terminally ill patient will be able to obtain the neces-
sary quantity of lethal medications from the patient's physician, and if
the particular physician refuses to prescribe them, the patient can sim-
ply find another physician. Consequently the controversy over as-
sisted suicide, at least in regard to terminally ill patients, may well be
superseded by the constitutional recognition of patient empowerment
to hasten inevitable death.'
8
18. Derek Humphry, the founder and from 1980-1992, the Executive Director of the
Hemlock Society, has defined "assisted suicide" as "[p]roviding the means by which a per-
son can take his or her own life," such as a physician's supplying medications with the
intention that a terminally ill person be able to use those medications to bring about that
person's death, and "active voluntary euthanasia" as "[t]he action of one person directly
helping another to die on request," such as "a physician agreeing to give a terminally ill
person a lethal injection." DEREK HUMPNHRY, LAWFUL Exrr. TIM LnAMrrs OF FREEDOM
FOR HELP iN DYING 12 (1993). Mr. Humphry argues that both "assisted suicide" and "ac-
tive voluntary euthanasia" should be legally permitted, because some terminally ill persons
will be unable to administer their own medications, and because many terminally ill per-
sons prefer the intervention of a physician to bring about their death. Id. at 81-86. As a
constitutional matter, a statute permitting the prescription, but not the administration of
lethal dosages of medications would be constitutional unless it was empirically demon-
strated that some number of terminally ill persons were unable to make effective use of the
medications. If this was demonstrated, then the regulation would be unconstitutional as
imposing an "undue burden" on the right of terminally ill persons to hasten their inevitable
death. See generally Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791 (plurality opinion).
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Professor Kamisar, who contends that a ban on assisted suicide
should properly extend to the terminally ill,19 is somewhat troubled by
the narrow and specific nature of the ACLU's substantive constitu-
tional challenge to Michigan's ban on assisted suicide. He says that
the ACLU is engaging in "good advocacy" tactics when it "only as-
sert[s] the rights of the terminally ill who may desire death by sui-
cide."20 As explained above, however, the ACLU challenge to
Michigan's assisted suicide ban only involves the constitutionality of
that ban as applied to terminally ill persons, because only terminally
ill persons and physicians treating terminally ill persons are seeking to
challenge the ban in this case. Moreover, the challenge is not to the
law's general prohibition against assisted suicide-the plaintiffs in this
case do not care about a ban on Dr. Kevorkian's suicide machine or a
ban on physician-administered lethal injections-but only to the ban
on physician-prescribed medications that would empower terminally
ill persons to make the choice to hasten their inevitable death.
For this reason, the constitutional issue presented in the ACLU
challenge is relatively narrow and quite specific. It is also the issue
that Professor Kamisar and the other opponents of assisted suicide
find the most troubling, because they have great difficulty in respond-
ing to the issue on the merits. They have a hard time justifying requir-
ing terminally ill people to bear unbearable pain and suffering, and
denying them the right to hasten their inevitable death. This is why
they quickly change the subject and warn of the slippery slope that
will follow if terminally ill people were empowered to use physician-
prescribed medications to hasten their inevitable death.
The fact that the issue presented in the ACLU challenge to Mich-
igan's ban on assisted suicide is so specific is not, as Professor Kamisar
says, simply "good advocacy." Nor is it, as Professor Kamisar also
asserts, "the technique of overcoming opposition to a desired goal by
proceeding step by step."'" Instead, it is the way that constitutional
issues are supposed to be litigated in the American constitutional sys-
tem. In the American constitutional system, constitutional law devel-
ops in a "line of growth," on a case-by-case, issue-by-issue basis.
Indeed, a fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication is that,
"constitutional issues... will not be determined... in broader terms
than are required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be ap-
19. Kamisar, supra note 13, at 36 ("There is no principled way to distinguish for consti-
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plied."'22 The meaning of a constitutional provision develops incre-
mentally, and that provision's line of growth strongly influences its
application in particular cases.3
The line of growth of constitutional doctrine is clearly illustrated
by the development of the constitutional protection of a woman's
right to have an abortion. The protection of abortion is part of the
constitutional protection afforded to the broader interest of reproduc-
tive freedom, which in turn is a part of the even broader liberty inter-
est textually protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. The constitutional protection of reproductive freedom as a
due process liberty interest traces back to a 1942 Supreme Court deci-
sion holding unconstitutional the discriminatory sterilization of con-
victed felons.24  The concept of reproductive freedom as a
fundamental right, first recognized by the Court in that case, was later
invoked by the Court in 1965 to hold unconstitutional a ban on the use
of contraceptives by married couplesI and then, in 1972, invoked to
strike down a ban on access to contraceptives by unmarried persons.26
So when the Court in the celebrated and controversial 1973 case
of Roe v. Wade27 had to confront the constitutionality of anti-abortion
laws, reproductive freedom had already been established as a funda-
mental right. The question before the Court in Roe was whether the
state's interest in protecting potential human life from the moment of
conception was "sufficiently compelling" to justify a prohibition on a
pregnant woman's entitlement to a medical abortion. The Court
held that this interest was not sufficiently compelling until the stage of
viability had been reached,29 and so in effect held that a woman had a
constitutionally protected right to a pre-viability abortion. In its 1992
decision of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,30 the Court reaffirmed the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade, but modified the decision somewhat
by holding that the state could regulate the abortion procedure, even
22. See the Supreme Court's classic discussion of this point in Rescue Army v. Munic-
ipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947).
23. See the discussion in Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional
Adjudication: An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 93, 118-20
(1983). The concept of "line of growth" of constitutional doctrine is explained in Terrance
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MiCH. L. Rnv. 1033, 1034 (1981).
24. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
26. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972).
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28. Id. at 154.
29. Id. at 163-64.
30. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
for the purpose of discouraging women from having an abortion, so
long as the particular regulation did not impose an "undue burden" on
the woman's decision whether or not to have an abortion.3'
In light of the case-by-case, issue-by-issue development of consti-
tutional doctrine, the ACLU's constitutional challenge to Michigan's
assisted suicide ban thus does not involve a claimed right to assisted
suicide or a claimed "right to die." It involves the specific question of
whether the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause embraces the right of a terminally ill person to choose
to hasten inevitable death and, if so, whether Michigan's absolute ban
on the use of physician-prescribed medications to hasten inevitable
death is unconstitutional as an undue burden on that right. In actual
constitutional litigation, that issue must be confronted directly with
reference to applicable Supreme Court constitutional doctrine and
precedents, and it cannot be avoided by "slippery slope" and "but
what if" kinds of arguments. Although these arguments may be ap-
propriate for academic or political discourse, they have no place in
constitutional litigation, and cannot be relied on to avoid confronting
the specific constitutional issue presented in the case before the court.
In contending that there is no constitutional right to assisted sui-
cide, Professor Kamisar does not directly address the constitutionality
of a ban against the use of physician-prescribed medications by termi-
nally ill persons to hasten their inevitable death. Instead, he insists
that for constitutional purposes, there is no principled way to distin-
guish between terminally ill persons seeking to hasten their inevitable
death and anybody else desiring "death by suicide."3 2 In the real
world, of course, we have no difficulty identifying the terminally ill.
They are patients who will die from a specific disease within a rela-
tively short period of time. Their medical treatment is limited to alle-
viating their pain, and the only thing that is not certain is the precise
time when their death will occur. They thus constitute a distinct and
identifiable class of persons, clearly separate from all other persons
31. Id. at 2818-19. Applying the undue burden standard, the Court upheld a Penn-
sylvania law imposing a 24-hour waiting period before the woman could have the abortion
and another requirement relating to physician-furnished information. Id. But the Court
invalidated a requirement that a married woman's husband be notified of her intention to
have an abortion. Id. at 2826-31. The Court concluded that a fear of violence by her
husband when informed of her decision to have an abortion could discourage some small
number of women from having an abortion. Id. Thus, the requirement imposed an undue
burden on the woman's abortion decision, and so was unconstitutional. Id.
32. Kamisar, supra note 13, at 36.
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who, to use Professor Kamisar's term, might seek death by suicide.33
And for this reason, it is not only possible, but indeed quite proper, in
the context of the ACLU challenge to Michigan's ban on assisted sui-
cide, to limit the challenge to the unconstitutionality of the law insofar
as it prohibits terminally ill persons from making the choice to hasten
inevitable death by the use of physician-prescribed medications.
B. The Right to Hasten Inevitable Death
The first part of the substantive constitutional challenge to Michi-
gan's assisted suicide law is that the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause embraces the right of a
terminally ill person to hasten inevitable death. The essence of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause is personal autonomy. A
person has the right to bodily integrity, to control of that person's own
body, and to define that person's own existence. As the Supreme
Court recently stated in Casey:
It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of per-
sonal liberty which the government may not enter .... It is
settled now ... that the Constitution places limits on a State's
right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about fam-
ily and parenthood, as well as bodily integrity .... At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Be-
liefs about these matters could not define the attributes ofper-
sonhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 4
33. It is appalling that the pejorative label "suicide" would be put on a terminally ill
person's choice to hasten his or her inevitable death. In no meaningful sense of the term
can a terminally ill person's choice to hasten his or her inevitable death by the use of
physician-prescribed medications be labeled a suicide. The term suicide conjures up the
image of a person jumping off a bridge or "blowing his brains out." The terminally ill
person, who is facing death, and who seeks to have the choice to hasten inevitable death by
the use of physician-prescribed medications, is not committing suicide by ending a life that
otherwise is of indefinite duration. The life of the terminally ill person is coming to an end,
and the question is whether the terminally ill person must undergo unbearable suffering
until death comes naturally, or whether that person can end the unbearable suffering by
the use of physician-prescribed medications.
Professor Kamisar does not say very much about the terminally ill, emphasizing in-
stead that most people who commit suicide are not terminally ill. Id. at 38. He, along with
most other opponents of assisted suicide, is rather uncomfortable when talking about the
terminally ill. So Professor Kamisar quickly brushes them off when he says that there is no
principled way to limit the purported right to commit suicide to the terminally ill. Id. at 36-
37. The opponents of assisted suicide then start down the familiar "slippery slope," sug-
gesting that once we start allowing terminally ill people to hasten their inevitable death, we
are but a few steps away from putting all "old and sick people" on the modem equivalent
of an "ice floe going out to sea" and ridding ourselves of the "inconvenience" of having to
care for them. Id. at 39.
34. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805-07 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted).
BANS ON ASSISTED SUICIDE
A person's entitlement to bodily integrity and control over that
person's own body protects the person's right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, including the right of a competent adult person to
make the personal decision to discontinue life-saving medical treat-
ment.35 It protects the right of a woman to have an abortion36 and the
right of men and women to use contraception in order to prevent
pregnancy.37 For the same reasons, a terminally ill person's right to
control that person's own body must include the right to make deci-
sions about the voluntary termination of that person's life. Terminally
ill persons must have the right to make the "most basic decisions
about.., bodily integrity," "the right to define [their] own concept of
existence" and "the attributes of [their] personhood," without the
"compulsion of the [s]tate. ' '38 Thus, logically, they must have the right
to decide whether to undergo unbearable suffering until death comes
naturally, or to hasten their inevitable death by the use of physician-
prescribed medications.
In arguing that any constitutional protection of a right to die does
not include protection of a "right to assisted suicide," Professor
Kamisar says that there is a difference between withholding or with-
drawing life-sustaining medical treatment and affirmatively commit-
ting suicide.39 This is true. But it is also irrelevant to resolving
whether the right of terminally ill persons to hasten their inevitable
death is a protected due process liberty interest and whether an abso-
lute ban on the use of physician-prescribed medications for this pur-
pose is an undue burden on the exercise of that right.
Professor Kamisar does not explicate any principled difference, in
constitutional terms, between the right of a competent terminally ill
person to hasten inevitable death by refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment and the right of the same competent terminally ill person to
hasten inevitable death using physician-prescribed medications. No
35. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) ("[Wle
assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitution-
ally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition."). In her separate opinion
in Cruzan, Justice O'Connor fully developed the reasons why the right of a person to re-
fuse life-saving medical treatment is encompassed within the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. ("[T]he liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to
reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water."). Id. at 287-
89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791.
37. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805-07.
39. Kamisar, supra note 13, at 33-35.
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principled difference can be found in the applicable constitutional
doctrine, and Professor Kamisar does not suggest one. Just as the per-
sonal autonomy reflected in the constitutional right of reproductive
freedom protects both the right of a woman to use contraception to
prevent pregnancy from occurring and her right to have an abortion to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy that has already occurred, the right
of a terminally ill person to bodily integrity includes the right to
hasten inevitable death, either by discontinuing life-saving medical
treatment, or by taking a lethal dose of physician-prescribed
medications.4"
C. Constitutional Protection of the Right to Hasten Inevitable Death
As pointed out above, what is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause is liberty, and a number of specific
individual interests are encompassed within this protection. It is true,
as opponents of assisted suicide contend, that the Constitution does
not specifically guarantee the right to commit suicide or the right to
die. But it is equally true that the Constitution does not specifically
guarantee the right to obtain an abortion, or to use contraception, or
for that matter, to marry or to parent children. Rather, all of these
specific individual interests are encompassed within the Due Process
Clause's guarantee of liberty, and, under applicable constitutional
doctrine and precedent, any governmental interference with these in-
terests is subject to constitutional challenge and must be justified.
Under the Court's two-tier standard of review for due process
and equal protection challenges, the degree of justification required
for an interference with a specific individual interest depends on
whether that interest is treated by the Court as constituting a "funda-
mental right."'" If it is, then the exacting compelling governmental
40. For a further discussion of this point, see John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Con-
stitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. R~v. 1139,
1176-77 (1991) ("If the competent patient has a right to cause her death passively by refus-
ing medical care, then her right to kill herself by active means should logically follow as
should her right to have the assistance of others in pursuing that end. State prohibitions on
suicide or assisted suicide may be viewed as imposing bodily burdens-by preventing their
removal-just as forcing unwanted treatment on a competent person imposes bodily bur-
dens. Suicide enables the patient to avoid the bodily burdens of severe illness and a life no
longer worth living, just as the refusals of medical care do. This logic would also make
consensual active euthanasia a constitutional right of a competent patient unable to cause
her own death.").
41. Fundamental rights have been defined as those rights which are "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be fundamental." Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See the discussion of fundamental rights in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-53 (1973).
interest standard applies instead of the less restrictive rational basis
standard.4' Looking to the precedents, particularly to Roe v. Wade
and Casey, it would surely seem that the individual's interest in bodily
integrity and in having the right to define one's own concept of exist-
ence that is reflected in the decision to hasten inevitable death quali-
fies as a fundamental right, so as to bring into play the compelling
governmental interest standard of review.
If the Court were to apply the test from Casey, it should find that
an absolute ban on the use of physician-prescribed medications im-
poses an undue burden on the right of a terminally ill person to hasten
inevitable death. In Casey, the Supreme Court held that a state may
not impose an undue burden on the exercise of a person's fundamen-
tal right to bodily integrity and control over that person's own body.43
The Court held that a law imposes an undue burden on the exercise of
a woman's right to have an abortion when it places a substantial ob-
stacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fe-
tus.' A ban on the use of physician-prescribed medications obviously
places a substantial obstacle in the path of a terminally ill person seek-
ing to hasten inevitable death. Indeed, a more extreme burden on the
exercise of that right cannot be imagined, and for this reason, Michi-
gan's ban on the use of physician-prescribed medications for this pur-
pose is unconstitutional.45
The state cannot assert any valid interest in requiring a terminally
ill person to undergo unbearable pain and suffering until death comes
naturally. The interest typically asserted to justify a ban on assisted
suicide is that of preserving life, or as Professor Kamisar puts it, in
42. The compelling government interest standard requires that when the government
uses a classification based upon a fundamental right, it must show that the classification is
necessary (narrowly tailored) to a compelling or overriding government interest. JorHN E.
NOWACK & RONAm D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrtmONAL LAw 579 (4th ed. 1991).
43. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819 (plurality opinion).
44. Id. at 2804.
45. There is no question, of course, that the state, in the exercise of its power to im-
pose reasonable regulations on the practice of medicine, could constitutionally regulate
physician participation in assisting the voluntary termination of life. Such regulations
would be constitutional so long as they did not impose an undue burden on the right of a
competent terminally ill person to hastening inevitable death. For example, the state might
limit physician participation in assisting the voluntary termination of life to practicing
clinical physicians and/or to clinical physicians who have been directly involved in the care
of the terminally ill patient. Such a regulation would assumedly be constitutional, because
it would not prevent the competent terminally ill person from obtaining physician assist-
ance in implementing his or her decision to hasten inevitable death. For an example of a
proposed regulation of physician participation in the voluntary participation of life, see the
model "Death with Dignity Act," in HumPHRY, supra note 18, at 133-52 (1993).
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preventing the disregard for life that he sees resulting from a "suicide-
permissive" society.' But there can be no valid interest in preserving
life when there is no life left to preserve. A ban on the use of physi-
cian-prescribed medications by a terminally ill person to hasten that
person's inevitable death does not advance any conceivable interest in
preserving life. Quite to the contrary, it does nothing more than force
a terminally ill person to undergo continued unbearable suffering until
death mercifully intervenes.
As stated at the outset, in constitutional litigation, it is "critically
important that we get the questions right and the answers right. '4 7
The question presented in the ACLU challenge to Michigan's ban on
assisted suicide is whether the absolute ban on the use of physician-
prescribed medications by terminally ill persons to hasten their inevi-
table death is an undue burden on the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The answer to this
question, in terms of the constitutional doctrine and precedents appli-
cable to the right of personal autonomy, should be resoundingly in the
affirmative.
H. A Journey Down the "Slippery Slope"
This section of the Article joins Professor Kamisar and the other
opponents of assisted suicide in a journey down the purported slip-
pery slope of legalizing assisted suicide and considers constitutional
challenges to a ban on assisted suicide that did not involve the termi-
nally ill. As emphasized above, all the ACLU seeks is a holding that a
ban on assisted suicide is unconstitutional as applied to use of physi-
cian-prescribed medications by terminally ill persons to hasten their
inevitable death. The holding would be a relevant but not a control-
ling precedent in a future case involving the constitutionality of a law
that prohibited suicide assistance to a person who was not terminally
ill, or that prohibited suicide machines or physician euthanasia.
Whether or not that precedent would be extended in future cases will
be determined only if and when those cases arise. This Part, however,
considers hypothetical future cases involving other applications of a
ban against assisted suicide.
In arguing that the Constitution should not protect a right to as-
sisted suicide, Professor Kamisar says that there is no principled way
to distinguish for constitutional purposes between the terminally ill
46. Kamisar, supra note 13, at 39.
47. Dixon, supra note 14, at 70.
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and others who desire "death by suicide."48 He goes on to say that, in
certain circumstances, life may be unendurable for one who is not ter-
minally ill, and asks if that person should have the same right to as-
sisted suicide that is being asserted for one who is terminally ill.49
Professor Kamisar's observations are true in part, but only in part.
The person who is not terminally ill but who desires what Professor
Kamisar calls "death by suicide" must base his or her constitutional
claim on the same Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest on which
we have based the constitutional claim of the terminally ill person to
hasten inevitable death by the use of physician-prescribed medica-
tions. And there can be no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of liberty, as defined by the Court in Casey, would extend
to a person's desire to end a life which has become unendurable.5"
For constitutional purposes, however, the situation of these persons is
at least potentially different from the situation of persons who are ter-
minally ill in regard to the justification that the state may be able to
assert for its interference with their choice to end an unendurable life.
Consider a case involving a hypothetical state law that prohibits
all assisted suicide except for the use of physician-prescribed medica-
tions by terminally ill persons to hasten inevitable death. This law is
challenged first by a person who has become so debilitated by multi-
ple sclerosis that the person is unable to move from his bed in a nurs-
ing home, requires constant nursing care, and cannot eat or perform
bodily functions without the assistance of others. The person wants to
end his life by consuming a quantity of lethal medications, which his
physician is willing to prescribe for him. That person contends that
the law is unconstitutional insofar as it prevents him from obtaining
physician-prescribed medications so that he can end his unendurable
life. There is no doubt that if this person's condition were such that he
could be kept alive only by being put on a respirator, he could refuse
to be put on the respirator or, if he had already been put on one, could
insist on being removed from it. As has been discussed previously, a
competent adult has the right to make the personal decision to discon-
48. Kamisar, supra note 13, at 36.
49. Id.
50. Again, to take the language from Casey, these persons have the right to make the
"most basic decisions about.., bodily integrity," the right to "define [their] own concept of
existence" and "the attributes of their own personhood" without the "compulsion of the
state." The right to choose whether to continue to live a life that has become unendurable
or whether to bring that life to an end precisely because it has become unendurable is
encompassed by these concepts. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805-07
(1992) (plurality opinion).
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tinue life-saving medical treatment.51 Professor Kamisar has said that
there is a difference between the withholding or withdrawal of life-
saving medical treatment and "affirmatively committing suicide.1
52
As we have pointed out however, this difference is irrelevant as to
whether the person's interest in ending a life that for that person has
become unendurable is a protected liberty interest for due process
purposes. But is it relevant in regard to the justification that the state
can give for the interference with this person's liberty interest by de-
nying him the use of physician-prescribed medications for this
purpose?
Again, what is the justification that the state can assert in this
situation? The claim of the multiple sclerosis victim that for him life
has become unendurable, like the claim of the terminally ill person
seeking to hasten inevitable death, is objectively reasonable. A ra-
tional person in the circumstances of the multiple sclerosis victim, like
a rational person who is terminally ill, could indeed reasonably con-
clude that the continuation of life has become unendurable. So, it
seems that the state would have a difficult time asserting the justifica-
tion that it is trying to prevent an irrational person from committing
an act that would cause his death. The state then would be forced to
rely on the essential justification that it asserts to justify any ban on
assisted suicide, that of "preserving life," or as Professor Kamisar puts
it, in preventing a "suicide-permissive" society.
53
In the case of the terminally ill person, this asserted preserving
life justification is easily countered, as discussed, by noting that there
can be no valid interest in preserving life when there is no life left to
preserve. Here, there is life left to preserve. The person debilitated
by multiple sclerosis may live for some additional years, and the
state's interest in preserving life is admittedly advanced to some de-
gree by keeping that person alive against his will.
The constitutional question then becomes whether this asserted
interest in preserving life is of sufficient constitutional importance to
outweigh the interest of the multiple sclerosis victim in ending a life
that has become unendurable. The answer to this question requires
constitutional balancing. The state's asserted preservation-of-life in-
terest must be balanced against the resulting interference with the
51. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. For examples of such cases see, e.g.,
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (1986); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651
(Ga. 1989); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
52. Kamisar, supra note 13, at 33-35.
53. Id. at 39.
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personal autonomy of the person seeking to end an unendurable life.
This justification is not likely to be found sufficient in the balancing
equation. In Roe v. Wade,54 for example, the Court held that the
state's interest in protecting potential human life was not of sufficient
constitutional importance to outweigh the interest of the pregnant wo-
man in bodily integrity. Assuming that a person's right to end a life
that has become unendurable would be treated by the Court as a fun-
damental right for due process purposes, then the Roe v. Wade prece-
dent may loom large in the balancing equation. There, the right of the
pregnant woman to control of her own body outweighed the state's
interest in protecting the right to life of the fetus, notwithstanding that
the great majority of pregnancies will end in a live birth. In the as-
sisted suicide case there is not even any third party life that the state is
seeking to protect. The state's asserted interest in the preservation of
life turns out to be no more than a symbolic interest, which would
seem to be of even less constitutional importance than the tangible
preservation of life interest that was found insufficient in Roe v. Wade.
And since the multiple sclerosis victim is helpless to bring about his
own death, a ban on physician assistance to enable him to do so is
obviously an undue burden on his right to end an unendurable life.
Once we get beyond the terminally ill and the physically debili-
tated, for whom life has become unendurable, do we need to proceed
further down the "slippery slope?" It is difficult to posit a realistic
constitutional challenge to a ban on assisted suicide brought by a per-
son who is not terminally ill or physically debilitated. Nonetheless, for
the sake of completeness, let us posit the following hypothetical case.
Jones wants to kill himself, but does not own a gun. He prevails on his
friend Smith, who does own a gun, to give him the gun and show him
how to use it. Smith does so, Jones kills himself, and Smith is prose-
cuted for a violation of the state's ban on assisted suicide.55 Smith
asserts in defense that the prosecution against him for assisting Jones'
suicide violates Jones' constitutional rights, and we may assume that
Smith would be permitted to assert this defense.56
54. 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
55. In State v. Bauer, 471 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. App. 1991), a 17-year-old defendant was
convicted of aiding a suicide and fetal homicide, when his 18-year-old girlfriend, who was
pregnant with his child, killed herself as part of a purported "suicide pact" between them.
He furnished the gun that she used to kill herself, but claimed that he tried to talk her out
of it and that she killed herself as he walked away.
56. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a physician being
tried as an accessory to a violation of the state's anti-contraceptive law for furnishing con-
traceptives to a married couple could assert the constitutional right of the married couple
to use contraceptives).
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Here the state's preservation-of-life justification is much more
substantial than in the case of the terminally ill person or the multiple
sclerosis victim for whom life has become unendurable. Here, the
state's justification is tangible rather than symbolic, and involves the
state's interest in protecting Smith against himself, so to speak. Con-
trary to Professor Kamisar's fears, we are not in danger of becoming a
suicide-permissive society, and we do not believe that it is objectively
rational for people to commit suicide. We will try to stop someone
from jumping off a bridge or blowing his brains out. Someone who
attempts suicide may be suffering from a form of mental illness at that
time, so that the attempt at suicide is considered to be pathological
and irrational.
It is well-settled that the state may, consistent with due process,
impose restrictions on a person's freedom in order to prevent that per-
son from doing something that the legislature considers harmful to
that person's health or safety.57 This principle-that the government
has the power to protect us from ourselves-is relied upon to defeat
due process challenges to a host of restrictions on individual freedom,
such as substance abuse laws, cyclist helmet laws, and mandatory seat
belt laws. 8 It is also relied on to justify the involuntary commitment
of a person who is "a danger to [himself]." 59 Undoubtedly the courts
would invoke this principle to sustain the constitutionally of a ban on
assisted suicide as applied to persons who are not terminally ill or not
so physically debilitated that it is objectively reasonable for them to
find that their life has become unendurable.6"
57. This principle is recognized in early cases sustaining against due process challenges
the constitutionality of laws limiting the number of hours that an employee could work on
the ground that the laws were necessary to protect employee health. See, e.g., Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (manufacturing); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
(hours of work for women); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (underground mining).
58. As Professor Tribe has observed:
[T]here are few constitutional checks on the government's power to protect us
from ourselves, whether by requiring the wearing of crash helmets and seat belts,
or by banning the smoking of tobacco, the snorting of cocaine, or the recreational
use of all-terrain vehicles. The intuition that one's safety is wholly one's own
business is simply too far out of phase with the reality of our interdependent
society to find any plausible expression in our constitutional order.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1372-73 (2d ed. 1988).
59. See, e.g. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-47 (1993).
60. From a doctrinal standpoint, the courts might say that the right to commit suicide
in this context is not a fundamental right, so that the rational basis standard of review
applies. Or they may say that the state's interest in preventing a person from committing
suicide in this context is "compelling." Either way, in this circumstance, they will sustain
the constitutionality of the application of the ban against assisted suicide.
Essentially, under applicable constitutional doctrine and prece-
dent, where it matters, bans on assisted suicide should be held to be
unconstitutional. These bans matter for people who are terminally ill
and for people who are so physically debilitated that for them life has
become unendurable. It is these people who need the assistance of
their physicians to prescribe lethal medications so that they can bring
their lives to a merciful end. And it is to these people and the physi-
cians who seek to assist them that current bans on assisted suicide are
being directed.
Allowing these people to receive physician-prescribed medica-
tions to bring their lives to a merciful end will not result in a suicide-
permissive society. Rather, it will allow them to have control over
their own destiny, and, in the words of the Casey Court, to "define
[their] own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life."'"
Concluding Note: The "Right to Go On Living"
Opponents of assisted suicide have argued one step further down
the purported slippery slope. They have contended that once termi-
nally ill people are allowed to hasten their inevitable deaths or physi-
In this connection, mention should be made of the rather bizarre case of Donaldson v.
Lungren, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1614 (1992). This was a suit brought against the state attorney-
general, asserting a broad constitutional challenge to the state's law against assisted sui-
cide. One of the plaintiffs was suffering from an incurable brain disease, and he alleged
that he wanted to commit suicide with the assistance of the other plaintiff, so that his body
could be cryogenically preserved. It was his hope that sometime in the future, when a cure
for his disease was found, his body may be brought back to life. He sought among other
things, a "judicial declaration that he has a constitutional right to cryogenic suspension
premortem with the assistance of others," an injunction against the prosecution of the
other plaintiff for a violation of the assisted suicide law, and a court order to prevent the
county coroner from examining his remains. Id. at 1618-19.
In rejecting this broad constitutional challenge to the assisted suicide law, the court
emphasized that the state had a "legitimate competing interest in protecting society against
abuses," which was "more significant than merely the abstract interest in preserving life no
matter what the quality of that life is." Id. at 1622. The ban against assisted suicide, said
the court, "protect[s] the lives of those who wish to live no matter what their circum-
stances," and "[t]he state's interest must prevail over the individual because of the diffi-
culty, if not the impossibility, of evaluating the motives of the assister or determining the
presence of undue influence." Id. at 1622-23. The court also noted that the ban would
"discourage those who might encourage a suicide to advance personal motives," and that
"suicide is an expression of mental illness." Id. at 1624.
As this case demonstrates, a broad constitutional challenge to a ban on assisted suicide
cannot be sustained, since the state does have a valid interest in protecting people from
themselves, particularly when they want to kill themselves so that their body can be frozen
and they can come back to life sometime in the future.
61. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791, 2807 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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cally debilitated people to end their unendurable lives, we as a society
are but a few steps away from putting all "old and sick people" on the
modem equivalent of an "ice floe going out to sea" and ridding our-
selves of the inconvenience of having to care for them.62 From a con-
stitutional standpoint, nothing could be further from the truth.
This Article has argued that the constitutional protection of per-
sonal autonomy embraces the right of terminally ill persons to hasten
their inevitable deaths and the right of physically debilitated persons
to end their unendurable lives. The constitutional protection of per-
sonal autonomy is even-handed. It means the right to choose between
available alternatives. The same Constitution, for example, that pro-
tects the right of a woman to choose to have an abortion also protects
her right to choose not to have an abortion. Thus, the state cannot
compel a pregnant woman to have an abortion any more than it can
prevent her from having one. By the same token, the Constitution
that protects the right of a terminally ill person to choose to hasten
inevitable death also protects that person's right to choose not to
hasten inevitable death. The specter of government euthanasia that is
at the end of Professor Kamisar's slippery slope would be constitu-
tionally impermissible. More specifically, any governmental efforts to
ration medical care would be subject to serious constitutional chal-
lenges precisely because they would interfere with the right of old and
sick people, and of people who are terminally ill, to make the choice
to go on with their lives.
At this point, there are no direct governmental efforts to ration
medical care under governmentally sponsored programs of medical
assistance, such as Medicare and Medicaid. But let us posit a health
care system, such as that which might emerge from the Clinton health
care proposal, in which there would be sufficient governmental in-
volvement in the delivery of all health care so as to satisfy the state
action requirement for constitutional purposes. Let us further sup-
pose that in an effort to keep health care costs down, the government
adopts regulations that eliminate costly life-prolonging treatments for
terminally ill or very old persons, and that eliminate costly medical
62. Kamisar, supra note 13, at 39. Professor Kamisar asks:
In a climate in which suicide is the "rational" thing to do, or at least a "reason-
able" option, will it become the unreasonable thing not to do? The noble thing to
do? In a suicide-permissive society plagued by shortages of various kinds and a
growing population of "nonproductive" people, how likely is it that an old or ill
person will be encouraged to spare both herself and her family the agony of a
slow decline, even though she would not have considered suicide on her own?
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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treatments that would alleviate the condition of physically debilitated
and disabled persons.
The justification of controlling medical costs or that "treatment
won't do them any good anyway," will probably not be constitution-
ally sufficient to justify a denial of costly medical treatment that is
necessary to support a terminally ill person's choice to continue living.
Also, it will probably not be constitutionally sufficient to justify a de-
nial of medical treatment that is necessary to prolong the life of very
old persons, or that is necessary to alleviate the condition of physically
debilitated or disabled persons.
The choice principle63-the constitutional guarantee of personal
autonomy embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause-protects the right of terminally ill persons to hasten their in-
evitable death and the right of physically debilitated persons to end a
life that for them has become unendurable. The same choice principle
protects equally the right of the terminally ill to go on living. Once
this is understood, it may be that the slippery slope will no longer be
so frightening to opponents of assisted suicide, and that they will no
longer be so fearful of a Constitution that protects the right to choose
to go on living in the same manner as it protects the right to choose to
die.
63. The choice principle relates to governmental interference with an individual's
choice to make decisions about that person's own life. It does not refer to "choice" in a
philosophical or psychological sense. People are subject to external pressures in all of the
decisions that they make and it may be, as Professor Kamisar contends, supra note 13, at
39, that once a constitutional right to terminate life in some circumstances is recognized,
the "old and sick" will come under pressure to end their lives. However, it cannot be a
valid constitutional justification for a governmental interference with an individual's choice
to make decisions about that individual's own life that some persons will be pressured
when they are making that choice. It cannot be doubted that some women are pressured
by their husbands, their boyfriends or their parents to have an abortion, and that in the
absence of such pressure, they would make the choice to continue their pregnancies. This
cannot be a constitutional justification for a prohibition on abortion. By the same token,
the fact that some terminally ill persons may feel pressured to make the choice to hasten
their inevitable death cannot constitutionally justify a prohibition on their right to make
that choice. Of course, the government can adopt reasonable regulations to ensure that
this choice, like any other choice, is voluntary and informed.
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